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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you finally buy the red sports car that you have always
hoped to own. It comes equipped with a state of the art, patented
folding top. The patent covers the combination of components in
the folding top; however, it does not cover the individual parts. After
several years of using the convertible, you notice that the fabric on
the top is worn out and needs to be replaced. When you replace it,
the patentee sues you for infringement, claiming that you replaced
the heart or the essential part of the invention and, therefore,
reconstructed the invention without permission. If this happens in
Japan, you may lose and be held liable for infringement.1 But if this
happens to you in the United States, the Supreme Court has held
that your actions constitute permissible repair.2 If, however, the sale
of the convertible was conditioned on a promise not to replace any
parts of the folding top when they became spent, you would probably
lose.3
What is going on here? Should you be able to repair something
you buy as often as needed and however necessary? Should a
patentee be able to restrict your ability to repair your own car?
Thomas Jefferson understood that the new Union had to recognize
intellectual property rights to develop a strong economy. Thus,
Jefferson sought to incorporate into the U.S. Constitution a provision
protecting inventors’ rights to exploit their inventions. Securing
intellectual property rights must have been of great significance to all
of the Founding Fathers because “a brief Constitution of barely 4,486
words, includes a clause guaranteeing the ‘right’ of inventors . . . to
royalties for patents . . . (the single mention of the term right in the
body of the Constitution).”4 Specifically, the Constitution, pursuant
to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, gives Congress the power “To

1. See MASAMI HANABUSA, AN ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE PATENT LAW 207-08 (1992)
(explaining that in Japan, impermissible reconstruction of a patented device occurs when an
essential part of the invention is replaced).
2. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961) (“Mere
replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly
or different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his
property.”).
3. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708-09, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1173, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a violation of a restriction reasonably within the scope
of the patent grant that does not violate state contract law may constitute patent infringement).
4. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE FIRE OF INVENTION, THE FUEL OF INTEREST: ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 1 (1996) (discussing a lecture given by Abraham Lincoln that explained the
significance of protecting patents and copyrights).
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Promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . .
Discoveries.”5
Abraham Lincoln was also a great champion of the patent system.6
He stated that:
Before [the patent regime], any man might instantly use what
another had invented; so that the inventor had no special
advantage from his own invention. The patent system changed
this; secured to the inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive use of
his invention; and thereby added the fuel of interest to the fire of
7
genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful things.

Congress provided for this patent right in the Patent Act of 1952,
which states that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell
or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”8 The patent
right has been interpreted by Congress and the federal courts to
grant the inventor only the “right to exclude” others from practicing
the invention; the patent right does not give the inventor the
“exclusive right” to practice the invention.9
Does this right to exclude also give patentees the right to prevent
repairs of their inventions? Typically, patentees are considered to
have given to the purchasers of their patented devices the authority
to use the patented devices.10 Generally, such authority also includes
the ability to repair the device.11 This grant of authority, however,
does not include an unrestricted license to “make” another device.12
At some point, repairs may be so extensive that they constitute a
reconstruction, or unauthorized “making,” of the patented device.13
The distinction between minor repairs and extensive repairs that
result in an impermissible reconstruction is not always clear.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. In 1859, Lincoln gave a “Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions” in which he explained
his views on the six steps in the history of liberty. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 1. In this speech,
Lincoln noted that the last great step in the history of liberty was the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution with a provision securing intellectual property rights. See id. at 6-7.
7. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions Jacksonville, Illinois, Feb. 11,
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 10-11 (Don E.
1859, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
9. See Giles Sutherland Rich, My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1, 3-4 (1994) (providing a brief
history of the “exclusivity” of the patent rights).
10. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, 5 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2](a) (1998) (observing
that under the “first sale” doctrine, the unconditioned sale of patented products to purchasers
gives such purchasers the ability to use, resell, and repair the product).
11. See id.
12. See id. § 16.03[3].
13. See id.
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Developing a consistent jurisprudence with respect to what
constitutes a permissible repair and what constitutes impermissible
reconstruction has posed quite a challenge to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.14 As
one commentator has stated, court decisions since the first Supreme
Court opinion on the repair/reconstruction distinction and its most
recent opinion “have shed little light on the supposed distinction
between lawful repair and unlawful reconstruction. Decisions since
[the most recent Supreme Court opinion], if anything, have clouded
the view.”15 Given this state of uncertainty in the law, should
patentees be able to enforce private contracts that redefine what
constitutes impermissible repair? Can patentees in effect “privatize”
patent law?
This Article raises issues for discussion with respect to the
distinction between permissible repair and impermissible
reconstruction. Part I explores the emerging inconsistencies in the
repair/reconstruction jurisprudence. Part II discusses problems
patentees may face in attempting to redefine what constitutes
“impermissible reconstruction” through private contracts with
purchasers of their patented goods.
I.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence

1.

Permissible repair
The Supreme Court first dealt with the repair/reconstruction
distinction in Wilson v. Simpson.16 In Wilson, the Court held that, after
several months of use, the replacement of worn out cutting knives
from a patented wood planing machine constituted permissible
repair.17
The Court’s reasoning, which is still considered
authoritative on this subject, was that:
When the wearing or injury [to the patented device] is partial, then
repair is restoration, and not reconstruction. . . . And it is no more
than that, though it shall be a replacement of an essential part of a
combination. . . . But if, as a whole, [the combination patented
device] should happen to be broken, so that its parts could not be

14. See id. (“The line between permissible ‘repair’ and impermissible ‘reconstruction’ is a
difficult one to draw and is the subject of numerous cases.”).
15. ROBERT HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 262 (4th ed. 1998).
16. 50 U.S. 109 (1850).
17. See id. at 126.
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readjusted, or so much worn out as to be useless, then a purchaser
cannot make or replace it by another, but he must buy a new
one. . . . But if another constituent part of the combination is
meant to be only temporary in the use of the whole, and to be
frequently replaced, because it will not last as long as the other
parts of the combination, its inventor cannot complain [that the
18
purchaser replaces the temporary parts].

Following this precedent, in Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated
Wrapping Paper Co.,19 the Supreme Court held that replacing toilet
paper rolls for use in a patented toilet paper roll and fixture
combination was not impermissible reconstruction.20 It should be
noted that the roll of paper was not separately patented.21 The Court
explained that:
the purchaser of the new roll does precisely what the patentee
intended he should do; he replaces that which is in its nature
perishable, and without the replacement of which the remainder of
the device is of no value. The replacement is of a product which it
22
is the object of the mechanism to deliver.

The Court also noted that the “distinction between repair and
reconstruction becomes of no value [in this case], since the renewal
of the paper is in a proper sense, neither one nor the other.”23
In a similar case, Heyer v. Duplicator Manufacturing Co.,24 Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, found that the replacement of
gelatine bands for use in a patented copying machine was not
reconstruction.25 Holmes explained that:
The owner when he bought one of these machines had a right to
suppose that he was free to maintain it in use, without the further
consent of the seller, for more than the sixty days in which the
present gelatine might be used up. The machine lasts indefinitely,
the bands are exhausted after a limited use and manifestly must be
replaced. . . . The machine is costly, the bands are a cheap and
common article of commerce. . . . We have only to establish the
construction of a bargain on principles of common sense applied
to the specific facts. We cannot doubt what the fair interpretation
is and it would not be affected even if every purchaser knew that
26
the vendor was prepared to furnish new bands.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 123-26 (emphasis added).
152 U.S. 425 (1894).
See id. at 436.
See id. at 435.
Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
Id. at 433.
263 U.S. 100 (1923).
See id. at 101-02.
Id.

1210

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1205

In Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,27 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether replacing the spent
fabric forming the top of convertible cars constituted infringing
reconstruction of a patent that covered the combination of flexible
top fabric, supporting structures, and a mechanism for sealing the
fabric against the car.28 This patent covered a combination of
unpatentable parts.29 In determining whether reconstruction or
repair had occurred, the Court relied on a “practical test” espoused
by Judge Learned Hand: “‘The [patent] monopolist cannot prevent
those to whom he sells from . . . reconditioning articles worn by use,
unless they in fact make a new article.’”30 In concluding that
replacing the spent fabric was permissible repair, the Court explained
that:
No element, not itself separately patented, that constitutes one of
the elements of a combination patent is entitled to patent
monopoly, however essential it may be to the patented
combination and no matter how costly or difficult replacement
may be. . . . Mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one
at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts
successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair
31
his property.

The Court, therefore, rejected the “heart of the invention” test,
which analyzes whether the most essential element is being
replaced.32 Similarly, the Court rejected an analysis of the time or
expense of the adjustment to determine whether repair or
reconstruction had occurred.33 The Court also held that there would
be no impermissible reconstruction by replacing components of a
patented device unless the individual component was patented
separately or the entire device was rebuilt at one time.34
27. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
28. See id. at 346.
29. See id. at 339 (noting that the fabric at issue is “an unpatented element” of the
“combination patent”).
30. Id. at 343 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir.
1945)).
31. Id. at 345-46.
32. See id. at 344 (rejecting the argument that the fabric being replaced constituted the
“heart” of the invention, and therefore, the patent must be held to grant a “monopoly” on the
fabric). It seems difficult to understand how one would apply the “heart of the invention” test.
The heart of the invention could be (1) the part that is non-obvious over the prior art; (2) the
most expensive component of the patented device; or (3) the largest element of the patented
device.
33. See id. (refusing to consider that the replacement of a “relatively durable” or
“expensive” element of a patented device constitutes “infringing ‘reconstruction’”).
34. See id. at 345 (stating that “[n]o element, not itself separately patented, . . . is entitled to
patent monopoly” and explaining that “in order to call the monopoly [which is conferred by
the patent grant] into play for a second time . . . [there must be] a second creation of the
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Four justices expressed that this “wooden” test was inappropriate.35
Justice Brennan concurred in the ultimate result, but felt that the
appropriate test to determine the distinction between repair and
reconstruction was based on numerous factors, including:
the life of the part replaced in relation to the useful life of the
whole combination, the importance of the replaced element to the
inventive concept, the cost of the component relative to the cost of
the combination, the common sense understanding and intention
of the patent owner and the buyer of the combination as to its
perishable components, whether the purchased component
replaces a worn-out part or is brought for some other purpose, and
36
other pertinent factors.

Three justices dissented but agreed with Justice Brennan that
numerous factors should be applied to determine whether repair or
reconstruction has occurred.37 Justice Black, who fully supported the
majority opinion, wrote separately to criticize the multi-factor
approach espoused by the minority.38 Justice Black warned that such
an approach would result in the application of:
a Pandora’s flock of insignificant standards, especially when it is
recognized, as it must be upon analysis, that consistent application
of the standards suggested would actually change the basic test
from “making” to something not satisfactorily defined but
indisputably different. And surely the scope of a patent should
never depend upon a psychoanalysis of the patentee’s or
purchaser’s intentions, a test which can only confound
39
confusion. . . . [The minority is suggesting] loose legal formulas.

In Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther,40 the Supreme Court again found that
no reconstruction occurred when a fish canning machine, which was
covered under a patent that also encompassed a combination of

patented entity”).
35. See id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the wooden test sets too narrow a
standard as to what constitutes impermissible reconstruction); id. at 372 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that under the wooden test, the narrow concept of what constitutes impermissible
reconstruction contradicts the established principle of applying specific facts of a case to
determine if there is a permissible repair or impermissible reconstruction).
36. Id. at 363-64 (citing Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100 (1923); Leeds & Catliw
Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909); Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850);
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Hesser, 131 F.2d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 1942)).
37. See id. at 372 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that whether reconstruction has
occurred must depend on principles of common sense applied to the specific facts of a given
case) (citing Heyer, 263 U.S. at 102).
38. See id. at 346 (Black, J., concurring) (stating that although he “fully concur[s]” in the
judgment, the multi-factor approach espoused by Justice Brennan and in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Harlan, “introduce[s] wholly unnecessary and undesirable confusions”).
39. Id. at 355-56, 360.
40. 377 U.S. 422 (1964).
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unpatented components, was restored.41 The purchaser of the
patented machine retained a repairperson to clean and sandblast his
rusted machines and to resize six of the thirty-five elements to enable
the machines to pack fish into a different size can.42 The court
reasoned that:
[The] . . . machines were not spent; they had years of usefulness
remaining though they needed cleaning and repair . . . . When six
of the 35 elements of the combination patent were resized or
relocated, no invasion of the patent resulted, for . . . the size of
[the] cans serviced by the machine was no part of the
invention. . . . Petitioners in adapting the old machines to a related
use were doing more than repair in the customary sense; but what
they did was kin to repair for it bore on the useful capacity of the
43
old combination, on which the royalty had been paid.

Overall, it appears that the Supreme Court consistently views
impermissible reconstruction as occurring only when all the parts of a
patented device (comprising a combination of unpatented elements)
are replaced simultaneously.44 The Supreme Court rejected any
“heart of the invention” test or “difficulty of replacement” test.45
Under such jurisprudence, one might think that the Supreme Court
would rarely consider a repair to be so extensive as to constitute a
reconstruction. The Supreme Court, however, has identified some
instances of impermissible reconstruction, as demonstrated in the
following cases.
2.

Impermissible reconstruction
In Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,46 the Supreme Court made its first
finding that alleged repairs were really reconstructions.47 The
plaintiffs had patents for a metallic cotton-bale tie that was comprised
of a metal band and a buckle.48 The buckle was stamped with the

41. See id. at 425 (concluding that although the modification of the non-patented
components of a fish canning machine “improved the usefulness” of the machine, it did not
make the adaptation a “reconstruction”).
42. See id. at 423.
43. Id. at 424-25.
44. See Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325, 332 (1909) (setting
out the standard for the difference between mere replacement and reconstruction), rev’d on
other grounds, Mericoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent INV. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668 (1944) (holding that
the Leeds rule “must no longer prevail against the defense that a combination patent is being
used to protect an unpatented part from competition”).
45. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344-46 (1961)
(rejecting both these tests when evaluating whether a replacement constituted repair or
reconstruction).
46. 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
47. See id. at 95.
48. See id. at 91.
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words “Licensed to use once only.”49 The band would remain around
the bale of cotton until it was cut, at which point the tie was
discarded.50 The defendants purchased the buckle and band as scrapiron, recreated the bands, and sold them as new ties.51 The Court
reasoned that this was reconstruction:
What the defendants did in piecing together the pieces of the old
band was not a repair of the band or the tie, in any proper sense.
The band was voluntarily severed by the consumer at the cottonmill because the tie had performed its function of confining the
bale of cotton in its transit . . . . Its capacity for use as a tie was
voluntarily destroyed. As it left the bale it could not be used again
as a tie. As a tie the defendants reconstructed it, although they
52
used the old buckle without repairing that.

It appears that the Court believed the patented device could only
be used once and any repair after that first and final use was a
reconstruction.53 In Aro, the Supreme Court explained that the fact
that the ties were marked “Licensed to use once only” was significant
in the finding of impermissible reconstruction.54 In Morgan Envelope
Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Co.,55 the Supreme Court expounded
on the “licensed to use one only” language.56 The Court explained
that it was evident that “the use of the tie was intended to be as
complete a destruction of [the device] as would be the explosion of a
patented torpedo. In either case, the repair of the band or the
refilling of the shell would be a practical reconstruction of the
device.”57
How did the Supreme Court know that replacing the broken band
on the cotton bale tie was a “complete destruction” of the device
whereas replacing the gelatine bands in the copy machines in Heyer
were not complete destructions? How did the Supreme Court know
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 94 (stating that after the tie left the bale, “it could not be used again as a tie,”
and that “[a]s a tie the defendants reconstructed it”).
54. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 343 n.9 (1961).
The Supreme Court, however, did not explain what role this language played in its analysis.
The question remains as to whether it was an enforceable contractual restriction or whether the
Supreme Court gave deference to the patentee’s noncontractual intention. Justice Harlan’s
dissent noted that nothing turned on the fact that this language was included on the ties. See id.
at 374 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (remarking that although the Court, in Cotton-Tie, did refer to
the language marked on the ties, “it is manifest that nothing really turned on that point”).
55. 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
56. See id. at 432-33.
57. See id. at 434. This analogy employed by the Court seems tenuous. It is questionable
how an exploded patented torpedo could be refilled and therefore, reconstructed.
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that refilling the shell of a torpedo would constitute reconstruction,
but refilling a roll of toilet paper (as was the case in Morgan) would
be merely a repair? Is the Court acting in a logically consistent
manner when determining if restoring a product is merely repair
rather than infringing reconstruction? Is the Supreme Court’s
“practical” approach nothing more than a “we know a repair when we
see it” type of test?
In another case, Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machinery Co.,58
the Supreme Court held that the sale of phonograph records for use
in a patented combination of a stylus and record was impermissible
reconstruction.59 The Court stated that:
It would seem that on principle when deterioration of an element
has reached the point of unfitness there is a destruction of the
combination and a renewal of the element is a reconstruction of
the combination. And it would also seem on principle that there
could be no license implied from difference in the durability of the
60
elements or periodicity in their use.

The Court’s decision in Leeds seems to have been based on four
factors. First, the Court noted that the discs were the “distinction of
the invention, constituting . . . the advance upon the prior art.”61
Second, the discs were in “active co-operation” with the stylus; the
function performed by the patented device was the result of the “joint
action of the disc and stylus.”62 Third, the records were not
perishable; they remained useful “for an indefinite period . . . usually
[lasting] as long as does the vogue of the sounds they record.”63
Fourth, the defendant’s records were not being used to replace
broken or worn-out records, but merely “to increase the repertory of
tunes” of the owner of the patented combination.64
It is difficult to reconcile the decision and reasoning of Leeds with
that of Wilson and Morgan, which were decided before Leeds. Wilson
stated that replacement of a an essential part of a combination would
constitute repair and not reconstruction.65 Was the toilet paper roll
and the fixture not in “active cooperation” in Morgan? In Morgan,
58. 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
59. See id. at 337.
60. Id. at 333.
61. Id. at 335. As stated previously, this “heart of the invention” test was rejected in Aro, the
most recent Supreme Court case on the repair/reconstruction distinction. See supra note 43-45
and accompanying text.
62. See Leeds, 213 U.S. at 335.
63. See id. at 335-36.
64. See id. at 336.
65. See Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109, 123 (1850) (“[R]epairing partial injuries, whether
they occur from accident or from a wear and tear, is only refitting a machine for use. And it is
no more than that, though it shall be a replacement of an essential part of a combination.”).
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however, “active cooperation” was not considered a factor in the
distinction between repair and reconstruction.66 Can the statement
of general principles outlined in Leeds be reconciled with any prior or
subsequent Supreme Court case?
In addition, why should it matter that the purchasers in Leeds were
using the allegedly infringing records to “increase their repertory of
tunes”?67 Is this relevant to whether the device is truly being
“reconstructed”? Obviously, the device is not being reconstructed
because it can do something entirely different with the new records
namely, play new tunes. This factor seems to be more relevant with
respect to whether the purchasers of the patented device are
exceeding the scope of their “implied license” to use the device rather
than whether they are reconstructing the device. In addition, it should
be noted that in Wilbur the Supreme Court expressly approved
adjusting the patented fish-canning machines to enable the machines
to perform a different function because the royalty had already been
paid for those machines.68 Why should the result in Leeds be any
different?
B. Reconciling Federal Circuit Jurisprudence with Supreme Court Precedent
The Aro & Aktiebolag decisions
Although it would be difficult to prove reconstruction under Aro,
recently the Federal Circuit has identified an example of
impermissible reconstruction in Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.69 In Aktiebolag,
the patents claimed a drill with a shank portion and a unique carbide
tip geometry.70 Over time, the drill tip would dullen and need
resharpening.71 The drill tip was not patented separately and
Aktiebolag issued guidelines explaining how to resharpen the tip.72
Aktiebolag did not allege that resharpening the tip was
infringement.73 Rather, Aktiebolag alleged that retipping the drill
when the tip could no longer be sharpened due to damage
constituted reconstruction.74 In deciding the merits of Aktiebolag’s
claim, the Federal Circuit stated:
1.

66.
(1894).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433
See Leeds, 213 U.S. at 336.
See Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422, 425 (1964).
121 F.3d 669, 674, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620, 1624 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See id. at 670, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
See id. at 671, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
See id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
See id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
See id. at 672, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
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There are a number of factors to consider in determining whether
a defendant has made a new article, after the device has become
spent, including the nature of the actions by the defendant, the
nature of the device and how it is designed (namely, whether one
of the components of the patented combination has a shorter
useful life than the whole), whether a market has developed to
manufacture or service the part at issue and objective evidence of
75
the intent of the patentee.

It should be noted that the court cited to no authority to support
its statement. This may have been because no Supreme Court
precedent supports such a proposition. Aktiebolag seems to resurrect
Justice Brennan’s minority position advocating the use of a multifactored test to determine the distinction between repair and
reconstruction.76
To determine whether replacing the drill tip was reconstruction,
the Federal Circuit examined several factors. First, the drill was spent
when the drill tip could no longer be resharpened, unless it was
retipped.77 Second, retipping required a complex procedure of
breaking the damaged tip and creating a completely new tip.78 Third,
the drill tip was not an easily detachable part, such as the knives in
Wilson, and was not intended to have a shorter life than the drill
shank.79 Fourth, there is no evidence of a substantial drill retipping
market, which would tend to show there would be a reasonable
expectation that the tip would require frequent replacement.80 Fifth,
75. Id. at 673, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
76. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 362 (1961)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the difference between repair and reconstruction is
based on numerous factors).
77. See Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 673, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (noting that some
customers who elect not to have the drills retipped would discard them instead).
78. See id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622. The court stated that:
[T]he nature of the work done by E.J. shows that retipping is more like reconstruction
than repair. E.J. does not just attach a new part for a worn part, but rather must go
through several steps to replace, configure and integrate the tip into the shank. It has
to break the worn or damaged tip from the shank by heating it to 1300 degrees
Fahrenheit. It brazes to the shank a new rectangular block of carbide and grinds and
machines it to the proper diameter and creates the point. Thereafter, the tip is honed
and sharpened, grinding the rake surfaces and the center of the point and honing the
edges. These actions are effectively a re-creation of the patented invention after it is
spent.
Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
79. The Federal Circuit cited Aro to support the proposition that examining the expected
life of the replaced part is a relevant factor. See id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. The Aro
court, however, merely recounted the fact that the fabric was expected to have a shorter life
than the convertible car top in its recitation of the facts of the case. See Aro, 365 U.S. at 336,
337-38. The Aro decision did not discuss the expected life of the fabric as a factor to be
considered during its analysis of the distinction between repair and reconstruction. See id.
80. Again, the Aktiebolag court cited Aro to support its assertion that the existence of a
replacement industry is a factor to be considered. See Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 674, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
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the patentee did not intend its drills to be retipped.81
This case raises numerous interesting questions. With regard to
the second factor noted by the Aktiebolag court, Aro seemed to
indicate that replacing an essential element at high cost and with
difficulty was not the test to determine whether repair or
reconstruction had occurred.82 Specifically, Aro stated that:
The Court of Appeals found that the fabric “is not a minor or
relatively inexpensive component” of the patented combination, or
an element that would expectedly wear out after a very short period
of use—although its “expectable life span” is shorter than that of
the other components—and for these reasons concluded that “an
owner would [not] rationally believe that he was making only a
83
minor repair” . . . . We think that test was erroneous.

The Aro court then explicitly rejected the proposal that “when an
element of a patented machine or combination is relatively
durable . . . relatively expensive, relatively difficult to replace, and is
an ‘essential’ or ‘distinguishing’ part of the patented combination,
any replacement of that element, when it wears out or is otherwise
spent, constitutes infringing ‘reconstruction.’”84 How can Aktiebolag’s
analysis of these factors be reconciled with Aro’s explicit rejection of
these factors? Did Aktiebolag implicitly resurrect the “heart of the
invention” test that was rejected by Aro? Did Aktiebolag in effect
resurrect the reasoning in Leeds regarding the “essential” feature of
the replacement part and its necessity in performing the function of
the patented device? Should the repair/reconstruction distinction
hinge on whether the part being replaced is easily detachable? The
records in Leeds were easily detachable and yet replacement of such
records was found to constitute reconstruction of the device.85
With regard to the third factor, can this case be distinguished from
the reconfiguration that occurred in Wilbur, where the Supreme
Court found permissible repair?86 In addition, was not the fifth factor
(BNA) at 1624. The Court in Aro, however, did not discuss this as a factor to be considered.
The Court merely stated the fact that a fabric replacement industry existed in the factual
background of the opinion. See Aro, 365 U.S. at 338 (noting that Aro Manufacturing is a
national leader in the production of replacement fabrics for convertible tops). The Court did
not advocate using this as a factor to determine whether a repair is really a reconstruction. See
id. at 345-46 (discussing the factors to consider in a patent infringement case).
81. See Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 674, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
82. See Aro, 365 U.S. at 344.
83. Id. at 343-44 (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement, 270 F.2d 200, 205
(1st Cir. 1959)).
84. Id. at 344.
85. See generally Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
86. See Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422, 424 (1964) (determining that the machines
had been renovated in such a way as to constitute “repair” rather than “reconstruction”).
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explicitly held to be irrelevant a week after Aktiebolag, when HewlettPackard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Manufacturing, Corp.87 was decided?
In Hewlett-Packard, the Federal Circuit stated “[t]he question is not
whether the patentee at the time of sale intended to limit a
purchaser’s right to modify the product. . . . A noncontractual
intention is simply the seller’s hope or wish, rather than an
enforceable restriction.”88 Why should the patentee’s noncontractual
intention be given any weight in the repair/reconstruction analysis?
May Aktiebolag be distinguished from prior case law based on the fact
that both parties agreed that the drill would be spent when the tip
could no longer be resharpened?89 But using this logic, was not the
entire convertible top spent in Aro when the fabric was spent?90 How
are lawyers advising clients to determine when patented products are
spent like an “exploded patented torpedo”?
The American Cotton-Tie & Sage Products decisions
Can Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc.91 be reconciled with
American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons?92 Sage’s patented device was a
system for disposing of contaminated items that was comprised of an
outer enclosure and a removable inner container.93 The inner
container, which was an unpatented element of the device, was
marked “BIOHAZARD—SINGLE USE ONLY.”94 Sage stated in the
patent specification that users should remove and discard the inner
container when it was full.95 Sage also sold replacement inner
2.

87. See 123 F.3d 1445, 1453, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1657-58 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting
Hewlett Packard’s argument that the “intent-of-the-patentee” must be considered when
evaluating the difference between permissible repair and impermissible reconstruction).
88. Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. In this case, the Federal Circuit held that
modification of unused patented ink jet cartridges to make them refillable constituted repair.
See id. at 1454, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. The court found this situation similar to the facts
in Wilbur-Ellis in which the repairperson modified resized elements of a patented fish-canning
machine so that the machine would pack fish into smaller cans. See id. at 1452, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1656-57 (citing Wilbur-Ellis, 377 U.S. at 422-25). Although both cases presented
modifications that did not constitute conventional repairs, the modifications were found to be
permissible. See Wilbur-Ellis, 377 U.S. at 425; Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1455, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1657.
89. See Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620, 1623 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (distinguishing this case from Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850)). In Wilson, the
Supreme Court found that if the part in question was meant to be temporary, there is no patent
infringement when the part is replaced. See Wilson, 50 U.S. at 126.
90. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 365 U.S. 336, 338 (1961).
91. 45 F.3d 1575, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that use of a
competitor’s removable inner container with a patented disposal system does not constitute
patent infringement).
92. 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
93. See Sage Prods., 45 F.3d at 1576, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
94. See id. at 1577, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
95. See id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
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containers.96
The defendant in Sage Products, Devon, manufactured inner
containers that could be used with the Sage system.97 Sage argued
that, when the inner containers were replaced, Sage’s disposals
system was impermissibly reconstructed.98 More specifically, Sage
argued that, because it was physically possible to reuse the inner
containers after their first use, there was a disputed material fact as to
whether the inner containers were spent; therefore, the grant of
summary judgment was inappropriate.99
The Federal Circuit
dismissed this argument in light of Sage’s own warnings to customers
to use the inner container only once.100 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit held that replacing the inner containers was permissible and
summary judgment had been properly granted in favor of Devon.101
Given the holding in American Cotton-Tie, why was replacing the
damaged inner container not viewed as reconstruction in the same
way that replacing the band in the cotton tie was held to be
reconstruction? In both cases, the patentees expressed their intent
that the replaced part was to be used only once.102 In both cases, the
entire patented device could not be used without having one element
of the device completely replaced.103 Is a distinguishing factor
between American Cotton-Tie and Sage that in American Cotton-Tie the
purchasers of the original patented products were discarding their
products whereas in Sage, the purchasers wanted to repair the
containers for their own future use? Are the courts merely balancing
the equities between the patentee and the purchasers and therefore,
because no purchaser was involved in American Cotton-Tie, the
patentee won? Should the repair/reconstruction distinction turn on
whether the purchasers believe they can, or should be able, to
replace a part of the patented invention?
96. See id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
97. See id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
98. See id. at 1578, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
99. See id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
100. See id., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
101. See id. at 1578-79, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767-68 (noting that the inner containers
are effectively spent when they are filled, allowing the user to replace them without infringing
on Sage’s patent).
102. See American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 91 (1882) (noting that the
patentee marketed these replacement parts as a one-use-only product); Sage Prods., 45 F.3d at
1576, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766 (noting Sage’s specification and warning containers that
mandate a single use only and Sage’s refusal to sell to buyers who reuse the inner container).
103. See American Cotton-Tie, 106 U.S. at 91 (noting that when the bale reaches the cottonmill the band is cut, separating the band and the buckle); Sage Prods., 45 F.3d at 1577, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766 (noting that the inner container of the 413 combination was
intended to be discarded when full so that in order to reuse the 413 combination, the inner
container must be replaced).
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This leads to the question of whose noncontractual intention, if any,
should count—the patentee’s intent or the purchaser’s? The
patentee’s noncontractual intent seems to be a “one way street.” If
she believes that a certain part will need to be replaced often, then
she cannot complain later when the purchaser replaces that part.104
Generally, the patentee’s noncontractual intent that her device not
be repaired is, however, given little weight,105 although the Aktiebolag
court did consider the patentee’s noncontractual intent to be a
persuasive factor in finding reconstruction.106 The role of the
purchaser’s intent is unclear. Some cases focus on what a reasonable
consumer would think she could do with the patented device,107 but
other cases give the consumer’s actual intent more weight.108 The
leading and most recent Supreme Court case, however, does not hold
anyone’s intent to be relevant to the analysis.109
The Aro Manufacturing & Lummus Industries decisions
In Lummus Industries, Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp.,110 the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of “whether the [jury] instruction was so plainly
contrary to law that, although not objected to [at trial], a new trial
must nevertheless be had.”111 The disputed jury instructions stated:

3.

The Court instructs you that the purchaser of a patented machine

104. See Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 434
(1894) (“[T]he purchaser . . . does precisely what the patentee intended that he should do: he
replaces that which is in its nature perishable, and without the replacement of which the
remainder of the device is of no value.”); Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109, 126 (1850) (“[I]f
another constituent part of the combination is meant to be only temporary in the use of the
whole and to be frequently replaced, because it will not last as long as the other parts of the
combination, its inventor cannot complain [that the purchaser replaces the temporary
parts].”).
105. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Co., Inc., 123 F.3d 1445, 1453,
43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1657 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (ruling that the patentee misread Wilson in
interpreting that intention of the inventor carried much weight).
106. See Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 674, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620, 1624 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (concluding that “[a]lthough the repair or reconstruction issue does not turn on the
intention of the patentee alone, the fact that no replacement drill tips have ever been made or
sold by the patentee is consistent with the conclusion that replacement of the carbide tip is not
a permissible repair”).
107. See Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923) (“We have only to establish
the construction of a bargain on principles of common sense applied to specific facts. We
cannot doubt what the fair interpretation is and it would not be affected even if every purchaser
knew that the vendor was prepared to furnish new bands.”).
108. See American Cotton-Tie, 106 U.S. at 93 (appearing to use the consumer’s decision to
throw away the cotton tie after the band was broken as evidence that the combination was spent
after one use).
109. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1961)
(dismissing the idea that the replacement of any one part that is not itself separately patented
would constitute patent infringement—in any case).
110. 862 F.2d 267, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1983 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
111. See id. at 272, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986.
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which includes a number of components not separately covered by
the patent has a right to repair the machine but does not have the
right to reconstruct the machine.
Repair of the machine is permissible when one component of the
patented machine wears out prior to the entire machine wearing
out. In this situation replacement of that worn out component is
permitted and does not constitute infringement of the patent on
that machine. However the replacement of a component which is not
worn out with an accessory component which is a material part of the
invention constitutes patent infringement, because it is reconstruction of the
patented machine.
[* * *]
The Court instructs you that you should consider all the evidence
presented by the parties as to the useful life of the [parts of the
combination], the relative cost, and all other evidence offered on that
subject in an effort to determine whether or not this is a repair or a
reconstruction.
[* * *]
Now the plaintiff contends, as I pointed out to you, that this is the
heart of the invention and that to make the reel, manufacture it
and to sell it new violates the very heart of the patent. The
defendants say and contend that it’s repair, that they bought the
overall machine, and that this is only a part and that to make [it]
new and to replace it is nothing more than repair.
Now you must determine from this evidence which of these
112
contentions is correct.

The jury instructions seem to direct the jury to focus on a “heart of
the invention” test and authorize the jury to consider numerous
factors (i.e., “all the evidence offered on that subject”) in
determining whether a repair or a reconstruction had occurred.113
This seems contrary to the clear mandate of Aro.114 The Federal
Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court decision, finding no clear
error in the jury instructions.115 It should also be noted that several
112. Id. at 269-71, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985-86 (emphasis added).
113. See id. at 270-71, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985-86.
114. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (developing the bright-line rule that unless all
of the unpatented elements of a patented combination are replaced simultaneously there is no
reconstruction).
115. It should be noted that the case may have turned on weak arguments that were made
too late to an appellate court. See generally Lummus Indus., 862 F.2d at 270-71, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1985-86. The appellants argued to the Federal Circuit that the instruction should
have included “the question of ‘whether the nature of the reels is such that their repeated
replacement is, and is expected to be, necessary to maintain the usefulness of the apparatus as a
whole during its anticipated useful life.’” Id. at 270, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985. This seems to
have been included in the general instruction to consider all the evidence. See id. at 270,
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years after this case was decided, the Federal Circuit explicitly
rejected the argument that “pre-mature” repair (i.e., the replacement
of a part before it is worn out) could constitute reconstruction,116
although it approved of the jury instruction in Lummus regarding the
requirement that a part be worn out before it can be repaired.117
C. Summary
Overall, many questions remain unanswered regarding the
evolution of the repair/reconstruction doctrine. Are judges acting in
a logically consistent manner by determining that restoration of a
product is merely a repair rather than an infringing reconstruction,
or is the “practical test” advocated by the Supreme Court merely a
“we know a reconstruction when we see it” test? Is the balancing of
numerous factors a useful framework, or would a bright-line test be
better? If Aro announced a bright-line test for assessing the
distinction between repair and reconstruction (i.e., unless all the
unpatented elements of a patented combination are simultaneously
replaced, there can be no reconstruction),118 why has the Federal
Circuit rejected the notion that a bright-line test could work in this
area?119 Does the current framework provide adequate public notice
8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985. The appellants also argued that the instructions “misinformed the
jury that manufacture and sale of the [component] cannot be ‘repair’ if the component is
sufficiently important element of the combination.” Id. at 271, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986.
Although this seems to be a strong argument in light of Aro, the panel viewed the appellants’
theory of the case as generally flawed. See id., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986.
116. See Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1917, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The court held that:
[A]s long as reconstruction does not occur or a contract is not violated, nothing in the
law prevents a purchaser of a device from prematurely repairing it or replacing an
unpatented component. Premature repair is the business of the purchaser of the
product, who owns it, rather than the patentee, who sold it.
Id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
117. See Lummus Indus., 862 F.2d at 269-70, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985.
118. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
119. In 1994, the Federal Circuit stated:
It is impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay down any rule on this subject
[the repair/reconstruction distinction], owing to the number and indefinite variety of
patented inventions. Each case, as it arises, must be decided in light of all the facts
and circumstances presented, and with an intelligent comprehension of the scope,
nature, and purpose of the patented invention, and the fair and reasonable intention
of the parties. . . . [The question of whether restoration is repair] should be
determined less by definitions or technical rules than by the exercise of sound
common sense and intelligent judgment.
FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Goodyear Shoe Mach.
Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146, 150 (1st Cir. 1901)). In FMC, the patentee argued that “although
each individual servicing of the . . . [unpatented elements in the patented combinations] may
have constituted repair, a majority of the elements of the claimed combination were
replaced . . . [over time] and that such replacement was tantamount to reconstruction.” Id. at
1077. The Federal Circuit held that Aro directed that sequential replacement of unpatented
elements in a patented combination could not constitute impermissible reconstruction. See id.
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of defining permissible repairs?
In light of the evolving
jurisprudence, what is a reasonable course of action for those in
replacement part industries to pursue?
In response to these ambiguities, many patent owners have tried to
contract out of this inconsistent public law regime through private
contracts with purchasers of their patented products.120 The next
section of this Article explores whether patentees should be able to
contract out of patent law as a matter of public policy. The section
addresses whether patent law is binding as part of the “social
contract,” or merely is a source of default rules that individuals can
alter by “private contract.”
II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE REPAIR/RECONSTRUCTION
DISTINCTION
Whenever a legal doctrine generates the type of controversy and
uncertainty that currently surrounds the repair/reconstruction
doctrine, it is either clarified by the courts and the legislature, or by
clever attorneys who design private contractual alternatives to avoid
the public legal regime. As discussed previously, in the long history
of the repair/reconstruction doctrine, the question has virtually
always been whether a particular modification of the patented
product amounts to a repair or a reconstruction in the absence of any
type of contractual restriction.121 In other words, the issue is whether
there has a been a violation of the property (patent) right. As more
recent case law demonstrates, parties are beginning to determine by
contract what constitutes an impermissible reconstruction.122
Increasingly, the Federal Circuit is faced with the question of whether
parties should be able to contract out of the public law regime with
respect to the repair/reconstruction doctrine.123
The Federal Circuit was presented with such an issue in
at 1077. Although FMC complained that the repair/reconstruction distinction was amorphous
and requested clarification for “both patent owners and potential infringers,” the Federal
Circuit refused to issue a bright-line test “for determining whether reconstruction has taken
place in those cases where all of the replacement under investigation has taken place at the same
time” because that case was not before the court. See id. at 1078 (emphasis added).
120. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text (discussing the patentees’ use of contract
to limit the uses to which a patented product can be put by the purchaser and to avoid the
repair/reconstruction doctrine).
121. See supra Part I.
122. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases wherein
patentees contract with purchasers as to what parts can be replaced and what can be used to
replace them).
123. The issue of how parties can form valid contracts restricting repairs under state contract
law is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article focuses instead on whether courts should
enforce such contracts.
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Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.124 In Mallinckrodt, the patentee
brought both a patent infringement and inducement to infringe
claim against a hospital and an aftermarket restoration company.125
The hospitals purchased Mallinckrodt’s patented medical devices,
which were accompanied by “single use only” notice. After the
devices had initially been used, the hospitals contracted with another
private company (Medipart) to service the devices returning them to
operable condition.
The district court did not consider whether the “single use only”
notice was legally sufficient to constitute a valid contract.126 Rather,
the district court held that as a matter of patent law, the “single use
only” restriction was not enforceable as a violation of the first sale
doctrine, which gives purchasers the right to use the patented
products they have purchased.127 The district court’s decision not to
enforce the contract was primarily based on public policy grounds.128
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that there was no
precedent to support the district court’s reasoning that a patent
holder could not restrict the initial purchaser’s use of the patented
product.129 The court stated the “single use only” restriction “does
not per se violate the doctrine of patent misuse or the antitrust law.
Use in violation of a valid restriction may be remedied under the patent
law, provided that no other law prevents enforcement of the
patent.”130 The court remanded for a determination of whether the
sale of the medical device was “validly conditioned under the
applicable law such as the law governing sales and licenses and
[whether] the restriction on reuse was within the scope of the patent
grant or otherwise justified . . . .”131 If the district court found the sale
validly conditioned and within the scope of the patent or otherwise
justified, then violation of the restriction could be remedied by an
action for patent infringement.132 The court also explained that “if reuse
124. 976 F.2d 700, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
125. See id. at 701, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
126. See id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (stating that the lower court did not determine
whether “single use only” notion was legally sufficient to constitute a license or condition of sale
from the patentee to the purchaser).
127. See id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
128. See id. at 708, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (discussing district court’s public policy
argument against allowing conditions to be placed on the sale of a patented good for fear of
price fixing).
129. See id. at 701, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
130. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 709, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (emphasis added).
132. See id. at 701, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (stating that Mallinckrodt would have a
valid patent infringement case against Medipart, or any other medical device reprocessor, who
reprocesses the Ultra-Vent if the “single use only” designation is properly within the scope of
Mallinckrodt’s patent).
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is established to have been validly restricted, then even repair may
constitute patent infringement.”133 In other words, if a patented
device is licensed for single use only, any reuse is unlicensed and is a
patent infringement and there is no reason to choose between repair
and reconstruction; the contract determines what is impermissible
reconstruction not the public law.134
The court’s holding that the first sale doctrine can be limited
contractually has been endorsed in several subsequent cases. In The
Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Technology, Inc.,135 the Federal Circuit
affirmed Mallinckrodt, holding that a contractual limitation on the
right to use a patented article is valid notwithstanding the first sale
doctrine.136 The court stated: “[t]hus, in Mallinckrodt, we recognized
that breach of an enforceable condition of sale or license may leave
the breaching party open to a claim for patent infringement.”137 In
addition, the Hewlett-Packard court noted at several points throughout
the opinion that a contractual limitation may serve as a valid limit on
a party’s right to use a patented device once purchased.138 “[A]bsent
a restriction having contractual significance, a purchase carries with it
the right to modify as long as reconstruction of a spent product does
not occur.”139 In B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,140 the
Federal Circuit again echoed this sentiment:
[the] exhaustion doctrine, however, does not apply to an expressly
conditional sale or license. In such a transaction, it is more
reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects
only the value of the “use” rights conferred by the patentee. As a
result, express conditions accompanying the sale or license of a
141
patented product are generally upheld.

Thus, after Mallinckrodt, it appears that, by contractually limiting
the number of times a patented product may be used by an initial
purchaser, a patentee may be able to contract out of the

133. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
134. See id. at 709, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
135. 85 F.3d 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
136. See id. at 1576, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (reaffirming that the holding in
Mallinckrodt would be a contract violation if the “single use only” labeling restriction would be
deemed an enforceable contract restriction).
137. Id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (emphasis added).
138. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Co., Inc., 123 F.3d 1445, 145355, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1657-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
139. Id. at 1453, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657 (citing Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173).
140. 124 F.3d 1419, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 1426, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901 (citing General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938)); Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1179.
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repair/reconstruction doctrine.142 Mallinckrodt, however, also raises
several interesting questions regarding the enforceability of use
restrictions on patented products.
A. Single Use Only Restrictions as Patent Misuse
The Mallinckrodt court considered the issue of the enforceability of
the single use restriction to be an issue of patent misuse.143 Some
commentators have stated that Mallinckrodt essentially conflated the
patent misuse analysis with an antitrust analysis.144 Mallinckrodt,
however, seems to have held that the single use only restriction was
not per se patent misuse.145 The Federal Circuit also directed the
district court to determine whether “the restriction on reuse was
within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise justified.”146 Certainly, it is
unclear what it means for a restriction to be within the “scope of the
patent grant” or “otherwise justified.”
Should it be patent misuse to contract out of the public law
regime? If patent rights are granted for limited times to stimulate
innovations in order to promote public welfare, should a use
restriction that upsets this delicate balance between the inventor’s
incentives and the public welfare be struck down by the courts as
patent misuse?147 Are courts capable of determining whether such
142. As one commentator has stated, “[b]y using Mallinckrodt, patentees can control and
suppress undesired kinds of parts repair and replacement, supply replenishment, and
equipment modifications. . . . [T]he Mallinckrodt doctrine will result in increased revenue for
patent owners.” Richard Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After Mallinckrodt—An Idea in Search of
Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 51 (1994).
143. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708-09, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
144. See Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1928 (1997)
(“[I]n Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. the Federal Circuit moved toward eliminating patent
misuse as a distinct doctrine. . . . Mallinckrodt confirms that . . . the Federal Circuit will decide
allegations of patent misuse by looking solely to antitrust principles.”).
145. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708-09, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
146. Id. at 709, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (emphasis added).
147. In one of the first misuse cases, the Supreme Court turned to such patent policy issues
rather than antitrust issues to find patent misuse. In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488 (1942), the Court stated that:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent monopoly carries out a
public policy adopted by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, “to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to . . .
Inventors the exclusive right . . .” to their “new and useful” inventions.
Id. at 492 (citation omitted); see also B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942) (affirming
dismissal of suit after finding that maintaining it to restrain any form of infringement would be
contrary to public policy); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
510-11 (1917) (“[T]his court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws
is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners but is ‘to promote the progress of science
and useful arts’ . . . .”). Refusing to enforce otherwise valid contractual restrictions on public
policy grounds certainly is not new in other contexts. For example, covenants not to compete
must be reasonable in order to be enforceable. See Vencor, Inc. v. Webb, 33 F.3d 840, 844, 845
(7th Cir. 1994). Similarly, “trailer clauses,” which require employees to assign their inventions
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restrictions inhibit or promote innovation?
The issue of contracting out of public intellectual property law is
being hotly debated in scholarly journals and the press with respect
to “shrinkwrap” or “click wrap” licenses in the copyright context.148
One of the issues is the enforceability of agreements that require the
purchasers of copyrighted materials to give up their fair use rights.149
Another issue focuses on whether parties can decide what is a “work
of authorship” by contract, thereby securing copyright rights where
federal law normally would not grant them.150 The concern is
whether such agreements will “upset the federal copyright bargain.”151
It should be noted that the issue of whether such “shrinkwrap”
licenses are a form of copyright misuse is still an open question.152
to their respective employers for a period of time after they leave their jobs, are also subject to a
“reasonableness” requirement. See Gillette Co. v. Williams, 360 F. Supp. 1171, 1176-77 (D.
Conn. 1973) (permitting restriction for two years after employment terminated as reasonable);
Armorlite Lens Co. v. Campbell, 340 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (rejecting a similar
provision as too broad and therefore was an unreasonable restraint).
148. “Click wrap” licenses are agreements whereby an Internet user must “click” on an icon
and agree to the terms specified therein to access a particular web site. “Shrinkwrap” licenses
are agreements that become effective when the consumer opens the plastic “shrinkwrap” on the
software package. See generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing “shrinkwrap” licenses in general, and holding that these licenses are enforceable
unless they violate contract law), rev’g 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
149. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Proprietary Rights in Digital Data: The Future of Copyright and
Contract Law in a Networked World, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 511, 512 (1994) (maintaining that
Internet providers protect data through copyright protection and contracts, and as a result,
Congress will be forced to decide the enforceability of contract’s between internet users and
providers that effectively nullify the Copyright Act’s fair use provisions); Ramona L. Paetzold,
Comment, Contracts Enlarging a Copyright Owners Rights:
A Framework for Determining
Unenforceability, 68 NEB. L. REV. 816, 831-32 (1989) (arguing that a copyright owners’ attempts
to eliminate fair use rights through contractual agreements should be evaluated for
enforcement under a rule of reason standard).
150. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-54 (discussing whether shrinkwrap licenses that are treated
as contracts should be enforceable under the Copyright Act because 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
preempts any “legal or equitable rights [under state law] that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103”).
151. Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of American Copyright Law,
87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 176 (1999) (explaining that with the shrink-wrap licenses and click-here
contracts, the copyright industry can mass-distribute copyrighted works and require users to
relinquish federally created users’ privileges, which is inconsistent with federal copyright law,
which establishes certain protections for copyright owners, and certain copy rights for users).
As another commentator has stated:
Users are arguably always subject to restrictions when they use a copyrighted work.
But restrictions imposed by copyright law are limited and reflect the balance between
the need to induce creation and the need to guarantee public access to information.
If copyright owners are free to use contractual arrangements to restrict use, and are
then able to use copyright to prevent any use that is not subject to these restrictions,
owners are gaining an absolute monopoly over their works.
Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93,
109-10 (1997).
152. See William E. Thomson & Margaret Y. Chu, Overstepping the Bounds: Copyright Misuse,
15 COMPUTER LAW 1, 5 (1998).
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In both the copyright and patent contexts, the issue is whether
freedom of contract concerns should prevail or whether public
intellectual property law represents an immutable legislative balance
to promote innovation through incentives that are limited by the
need to disseminate these intellectual goods.153 Another interesting
issue raised by contractual agreements on infringement is the extent
to which state contract law will influence what is and what is not
infringing use rather than relying on a uniform body of federal law.154
One concern is that this use of state contract law undermines federal
preemption in the context of patents and copyrights.
The issue of contracting out of the public intellectual law regime
also arises in the trade secret context.155 Can the owner of a trade
secret contractually restrict a purchaser from discovering the trade
secret through reverse engineering? Typically, trade secret laws
provide that, if someone (who is under no duty of confidentiality)
can reverse engineer a lawfully obtained product embodying a trade
secret, the trade secret owner cannot prevent that person from
practicing the invention.156 The rationale for refusing to enforce
these contracts centers on the argument that the trade secret owner
is attempting by contract to gain protection not afforded by trade
secret law.157 The trade secret owner may even be attempting to gain
patent-like protection for its trade secret through contracts extending
its exclusive use of the trade secret without giving the public any of
the benefits of patent law (i.e., public disclosure of the invention).158
153. For a discussion of the “freedom of contract model” and the “public domain model,”
see Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 53, 77-79 (1997).
154. See Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 333, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that the author’s copyright infringement claim was only incidental to the author’s
contractual claim so that the claim did not occur under the Copyright Act thus giving federal
jurisdiction, but rather resolution occurs for breach of contract under questions of fact and
state contract law); Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 133, 135 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(holding that the dispute revolved around an interpretation of the contract, not an
examination of the works for copyright infringement, and this was a matter of state contract law
over which federal courts do not have jurisdiction).
155. See Jay Simon, Antitrust Aspects of Trade Secrets, 269 PLI/P 309, 322 (1989) (stating that
contracts that involve licensing trade secrets are governed by state contract law).
156. See David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of
Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 570 (1992)
(noting that trade secret law does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest
means, such as independent invention, accidental disclosure, and reverse engineering).
157. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 142 (1989) (holding
that reverse engineering is one of the rights granted to the federal patent holder, but not to a
trade secret holder).
158. See id. The Court wrote that:
[T]he threat of reverse engineering of unpatented articles creates a significant spur to
the achievement of the rigorous standards of patentability established by Congress.
By substantially altering this competitive reality, [statutes restricting reverse
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Not surprisingly, the courts are split on whether such contracts that
“opt out” of the public law are enforceable.159
Perhaps it is too stark to pose the issue as to whether public
intellectual property law is merely a set of default rules parties can
contract around or whether such public law is an immutable,
legislative balance of competing interests.160 Instead, it is possible that
public intellectual property law is a hybrid, where certain portions of
the public law represent “immutable” rules and other portions are
default rules.161 For example, the Supreme Court has held that a
patentee’s attempt to secure royalties beyond the grant of its patent
was void as the patentee was trying to achieve through contract what
the patentee could not obtain under the patent law.162
Similarly, a patentee’s attempt to contract out of the
repair/reconstruction doctrine could be seen as an attempt to
secure, by contract, what is not permitted by law, or it could fall into a
category of patent doctrines that one could limit by contract.163
B. The Conceptual Collapse of Contract Law and Property Law
The previous section reviews the issue of whether single use
contractual restrictions should be enforced against the initial

engineering] may erect themselves as substantial competitors to the federal patent
scheme. Such a result would contravene the congressional intent to create a uniform
system for determining the boundaries of public and private right in utilitarian and
design ideas.
Id.
159. Compare K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Too Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782, 782
(Tex. 1958) (finding that the opt-out was provision enforceable), with Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that the opt-out provision was void for
public policy because touched upon federal law).
160. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239,
1274-75 (1995) (contemplating whether, in the intellectual property law context, federal
statutes were intended as default rules or whether there is a public interest in enforcing
licensing agreements); see also O’Rourke, supra note 153, at 90 (arguing that Congress should
provide more guidance to the judiciary as to which copyright rules are immutable and which
are subject to change by private agreement).
161. See Lemley, supra note 160, at 1274-75 (explaining that public and private interests
should only be overridden when there is an affirmative governmental policy benefit).
162. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1964) (holding that an attempt to “project
[the expiration of patents] into another term by continuation of the licensing agreement is
unenforceable”).
163. See General TW King Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938)
(holding that it seems clear that a restrictive license is legal); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (determining that
express conditions accompanying the sale or license of a patented product are generally
upheld); see also Richard Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After Mallinckrodt – An Idea in Search of
Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 51 (1994) (concluding that post-Mallinckrodt jurisprudence
would benefit patentees by eliminating the exhaustion doctrine in contracts, which previously
had defeated patentees’ remedies).
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purchasers, i.e., those in contractual privity with the patentee.164 This
section raises the potential difficulty with enforcing contractual single
use restrictions with regard to subsequent buyers and users, that is,
those who are not in contractual privity with the patentee.
Why did the Federal Circuit judge Medipart’s actions based on a
contract to which it was not a party?165 Has Mallinckrodt in effect
collapsed the analysis of contract law issues with property (patent) law
issues? Should not Medipart’s actions be judged solely by property
(patent) law? Or do contractual restrictions on use “run” with the
patented product? Is notice the touchstone for use restrictions
applying against third parties?
In Mallinckrodt, it was undisputed that Medipart had notice of the
single use restriction, but it is unclear what significance the court
assigned to this admission. Consider the following hypothetical: A
hospital (the “initial purchaser”) buys and uses a patented medical
device from the patentee/manufacturer (“X”) with a contractually
valid single use restriction, uses the device, and then sells it to
another hospital (the “subsequent purchaser”) without giving notice
of the restriction. The subsequent purchaser has a repair shop
recondition the device and then reuses it. Clearly, X could sue the
initial purchaser for breach of the single use restriction. But could X
sue the subsequent purchaser and the repair shop for patent
infringement? Under patent law, X has the right to exclude others
from “making” its patented devices even if they are not in contractual
privity with it.166 Thus, X could sue under the public law regime and
invoke the repair/reconstruction doctrine.167 Could X enforce its
contractual single use restriction against parties with whom it is not in
contractual privity or, at least, those parties who had no notice of the
contractual restriction?168 In this hypothetical, X may have some
164. See infra Part II.A.
165. It is undisputed that Medipart was not a party to the sales agreement between
Mallinckrodt and the hospitals. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701-02, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1179.
166. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell
or sells any patented invention, with the United States during the term of the patent therefore,
infringes the patent.”).
167. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 10, § 1603[2](a) (explaining that purchaser has the right to
repair but not to reconstruct new product).
168. For an interesting discussion of ways patent holders can restrict use by future
purchasers of their patented products, see generally Thomas Arno, Use Restrictions and the
Retention of Property Interests in Chattels through Intellectual Property Rights, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279
(1994). Arno compares Mallinckrodt’s murky treatment of infringement by parties who are not
in a contractual relationship with the patent holder with the Third Circuit’s treatment of a
similar issue in the copyright context. See id. at 286-87. In Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293
F.2d 510, 516-17 (3d Cir. 1961), the court held that a restriction on the use of a copyrighted
work did not bind subsequent purchasers of the work, whether or not they had notice of the
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difficulty in enforcing single use restrictions against subsequent
purchasers and users.
It would be useful for the courts and the Bar to maintain an
interstitial separation between the concepts of property rights and
contract rights. Otherwise, we may be entering a development phase
of intellectual property law that erodes the balance imposed by the
constitutionally-mandated statutory scheme.
By creating a
contractual limitation on patent use, we may be imposing burdens on
third parties and judging them on contract terms to which they are
not parties and to which they have no notice.169
CONCLUSION
The repair/reconstruction doctrine raises numerous issues for
consideration by both scholars and the Bar. Yet there appears to be a
stark lack of commentary on these issues. The current state of the
public law distinction between permissible repair and impermissible
reconstruction appears to be rather uncertain. The attempt by
patentees to contract out of this public law regime also appears
uncertain because of two types of enforceability problems. First,
contracting out of the public law regime may, in certain cases, be
against public policy and raise issues of patent misuse. Second,
patentees may have difficulty enforcing these restrictions against
subsequent purchasers and users. Patentees appear to be walking on
a tight rope and may incidis in Scyllan cupiem vitare Charybdin (fall into
Scylla in seeking to avoid Charybdis).

restriction. See id. at 516-17. Thus, the copyright holder could not sue the subsequent
purchaser for copyright infringement under the term of its agreement with the initial
purchaser or licensee. See id. at 517 (holding that once lawful ownership is transferred to a first
purchaser, the copyright holders’ power of control in the sale of the copy ceases).
169. It is also useful to separate analytically the concepts of property rights and contract
rights in other contexts, such as the “parallel importation” of patented goods. Parallel
importation issues arise in the following circumstances: A patentee sells her patented product
in the United States for $100, and she sells her product to a distributor in a developing country
(“X”) for $30 with the provision that the distributor only sell her product in that country. The
distributor abides by the contract. Subsequent purchasers, however, eventually try to import
these same devices into the United States for a retail price of $70. Can the patentee prevent the
importation of these devices under patent law, or have her property rights with regard to resale
of those devices been exhausted, restricting her recovery to a contractual remedy?

